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On September 8, 1951, the United States and 47 other Allied
Powers signed the Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan (Japan-U.S.
Peace Treaty).' Article 14 of the treaty provides that the Allied nations
will "waive all ... claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals aris-
ing out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of
the prosecution of the war."2 On March 22, 2001, Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA) introduced the Justice for United States Prison-
ers of War Act of 2001 (Justice for POWs Act).' This legislation re-
quires:
In any action in a Federal court brought by one or more [POWs]
.. against one or more Japanese nationals ... the court shall not
construe section 14(b) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan as con-
stituting a waiver by the United States of claims by nationals of
the United States ... so as to preclude the pending action.
During the 107th Congress, the Justice for POWs Act was co-
sponsored by 229 members of House of Representatives-enough to
pass the bill on the floor of the House.'
On its face, this legislation raises important questions about Con-
gress's ability to abrogate a treaty by ordering the federal courts to
construe the treaty in contravention of its plain meaning. In addition,
this legislation implicates the proper balance of power between the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches in the creation, interpreta-
tion, and revocation of international agreements and compacts.
Using the Justice for POWs Act as a case study, this Comment
examines the separation-of-powers issues raised by statutes that at-
tempt to direct the federal courts in the interpretation of treaties and
other laws. The goal of this Comment is two-fold: (1) to provide poli-
cymakers with a perspective on the constitutional implications of such
t B.A. 1998, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 2003, The University of Chicago.1 1952 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490 (1951).
2 Id at Art 14(b).
3 HR 1198, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec H 1114 (Mar 22, 2001). Companion
legislation was introduced in the Senate on June 29, 2001 by Senator Bob Smith (R-NH). S 1154,
107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147 Cong Rec S 7193 (June 29,2001).
4 HR 1198 at § 3(a) (emphasis added).
5 See Bill Summary and Status for HR 1198, online at http://thomas.loc.gov (visited Feb
28,2003).
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legislation, and (2) to explain the benefits of taking a formal approach
to the consideration of such legislation in the courts. Part I of this
Comment briefly describes the historical background of the Japan-
U.S. Peace Treaty. Part II examines the separation-of-powers doctrine
in the statutory and treaty context and notes the latent tension be-
tween formalism and functionalism in the Supreme Court's recent
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Part III examines the Justice for
POWs Act in the context of the Court's separation-of-powers juris-
prudence and explores the formalist-functionalist tension. Part IV
proposes that courts adopt a clear statement rule that would require
Congress to actually amend or repeal a treaty rather than use the
courts to constructively abrogate the treaty, and provides normative
justifications for a formalistic approach to the separation of powers in
this context.
I. HISTORY OF THE JAPAN-U.S. CONFLICT AND THE
PEACE TREATY
A. The Experience of U.S. POWs in the War with Japan
America's direct involvement in World War II began with the
surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. While
popular memory of World War II generally focuses on the horrors of
the war in Europe, the war with Japan was also quite harsh. The ex-
treme brutality of the war with Japan can be seen in the treatment ac-
corded to prisoners of war: While the death rate of U.S. POWs in
German camps was approximately 1.2 percent, the death rate of U.S.
POWs captured by Japan exceeded 40 percent.6 Indeed, some of the
most visceral episodes of the American military experience in World
War II involved the treatment of captured U.S. soldiers by their Japa-
nese captors. These events set the stage for the litigation and political
6 See Gary K. Reynolds, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured
and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan 11, CRS Report
RL30606 (Dec 17,2002), online at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30606.pdf (visited Mar 2,2003),
citing Charles A. Stenger, American Prisoners of War in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Persian
Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan: Statistical Data Concerning Numbers Captured,
Repatriated, and Still Alive as of January 1, 2002 (unpublished), online at http://www.vba.va.gov/
bln/21IBenefitsIPOW/docs/POWStatistics2002.doc (visited Mar 1, 2003). For additional informa-
tion about Japanese war crimes during World War II, see generally Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors:
Japanese War Crimes in World War II (Westview 1996).
7 See Former US World War II POW's: A Struggle for Justice, Hearing before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (Jun 28, 2000) (summarizing some of the ex-
periences of U.S. POWs after Allied forces in the Philippines surrendered Bataan to the Japa-
nese). During the event now known as the "Bataan Death March," the Japanese military force in
the Philippines marched almost 80,000 starving, sick, and injured Filipino and United States sol-
diers over 60 miles. Reports of the death toll from the march vary, but it is estimated that be-
tween 650 and 2,300 American military personnel died during the march. Reynolds, The Issue of
Compensation by Japan at 13 (cited in note 6). Other notable incidents include the transporta-
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disputes that continue to this day over the proper compensation to be
afforded American soldiers captured by the Japanese.8
B. The Peace Treaty with Japan
The Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty provides for the waiver of all claims
by the Allied powers and their nationals vis-A-vis Japan and its nation-
als. In return, the treaty provides each Allied nation with the right to
liquidate the assets of Japanese nationals subject to its jurisdiction
and, as "an expression of [Japan's] desire to indemnify" Allied POWs
for the "undue hardships" they faced while in Japanese custody, the
treaty provides for the liquidation and transfer of Japanese assets in
neutral countries to the International Committee of the Red Cross
with the aim of providing compensation to the POWs and their fami-
lies.'° In the United States, Congress established a War Claims Com-
mission through the War Claims Act of 1948" to provide compensa-
tion to American POWs."
tion of American POWs in the infamous Japanese "Hell Ships" where thousands more Ameri-
cans died. Id at 14. In addition, approximately 25,000 U.S. soldiers were used to perform forced
labor in support of the Japanese war effort while interned in Japanese prison camps. Id at 15, cit-
ing Linda Goetz Holmes, Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes in
the Pacific Using American POWs xiii (Stackpole 2001).
8 See Former US. World War II POW's at 6-10 (cited in note 7) (statement of David W.
Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (discuss-
ing pending litigation regarding compensation claims by former U.S. POWs).
9 See Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty at Art 14(b) (providing that the Allies will "waive all...
claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its
nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war").
10 See id at Art 16. The minutes of the Japan-U.S. Peace Conference also make it clear that
the intention of Articles 14 and 16 was to provide a mechanism for Japan to pay reparations
without being completely drained of all of its productive assets. See Conference for the Conclu-
sion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings 83, US Dept of State
Pub 4392 (1951) (statement of John Foster Dulles, Delegate of the United States) (describing the
treaty as "a solution ... which gives material satisfaction to the maximum extent compatible with
political and economic health in the Pacific area"). At the same time, however, at least one Allied
nation objected to the inclusion of the Allied nations "and their nationals" clause in Article 14(b)
because of concerns regarding a private right of action for Allied POWs, but the original lan-
guage was adopted by the Conference. See id at 197 (statement of Dirk U. Stikker, Delegate of
the Netherlands) ("It is my Government's view that article 14(b) . . . does not involve the
expropriation by each Allied Government of the private claims of its nationals so that after the
treaty comes into force these claims will be nonexistent.").
11 Pub L No 80-896,62 Stat 1240, codified at 50 USC §§ 2001-16 (2000).
12 Chief Justice John Marshall noted that treaties are the law of the land only when they
are self-executing because they "operate of [themselves] without the aid of any legislative provi-
sion" or, if non-self-executing, when the "legislature . .. execute[s] the contract" and makes it "a
rule for the Court." See Foster v Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253,314 (1829). It is unclear whether the
entire Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty is self-executing because some of the provisions appear to require
domestic legislation. However, with regard to the waiver of claims provision, the intent of the
treaty-makers appears to be clear with regard to the claims of allied nationals: The treaty is in-
tended to have the domestic effect of barring such claims. See Conference for the Treaty of Peace
with Japan at 82-84 (cited in note 10) (statement of John Foster Dulles). In addition, to the ex-
1096 The University of Chicago Law Review [70:1093
C. Efforts to Obtain Additional Compensation
Following Germany's recent settlement of claims brought by
Holocaust survivors, American POW groups sued a number of Japa-
nese companies," alleging that POWs were forced to engage in labor
during the war and claiming a right to compensation under laws de-
signed to assist Holocaust survivors. 4 These claims were dismissed by
a federal judge on September 21, 2000 on the grounds that Article
14(b) of the treaty barred any such claims by American nationals."
The judge held that the plain language of the treaty waived all claims
and that both the legislative history and the State Department's un-
derstanding of the treaty supported such a reading." Following this
ruling, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher introduced the Justice for
POWs Act to "allow American Prisoners of War (POWs) from World
War II to file suits against Japanese companies who forced them to
perform slave labor during their imprisonment."" This legislation, ac-
tively promoted by the POW groups that supported the lawsuit, is di-
rectly aimed at ensuring that POWs are able to file claims in U.S.
courts and accomplishes this goal by ordering the federal courts to ig-
nore the plain language of the treaty. ' While it is clear that Congress
may abrogate the treaty if it chooses to do so directly, this legislation
raises the serious separation-of-powers issue of whether Congress
tent that this provision may need domestic implementation, it seems reasonable to suggest that
the enactment of the War Claims Act of 1948 was designed to carry into effect the bargain
reached during the peace conference, and as such, provides domestic effect for these provisions.
13 The Japanese corporations involved include some of the largest companies in Japan:
Nippon Steel Corp., Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui & Co., Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co.,
and Kajima Corp. See, for example, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114
F Supp 2d 939 (ND Cal 2000) (consolidating several cases against some these companies).
14 See Reynolds, The Issue of Compensation by Japan at 33 (cited in note 6).
15 See Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d at 945 ("The treaty by its terms
adopts a comprehensive and exclusive settlement plan for war-related economic injuries which
[includes a] wholesale waiver of prospective claims."). It has been suggested that individual na-
tions may not bar individual claims brought by their nationals as a matter of international law.
See Maki Arakawa, Comment, A New Forum for Comfort Women: Fighting Japan in United
States Federal Court, 16 Berkeley Women's L J 174, 190 (2001). However, under U.S. law, it ap-
pears clear that in a major foreign policy dispute, the federal government has the ability to settle
the claims of its nationals en masse. See Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654,688 (1981) (hold-
ing that the U.S. government, when acting to resolve a major foreign policy dispute, has the au-
thority to settle claims of its nationals vis-A-vis a foreign power and its nationals).
16 See Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F Supp 2d at 945-49 (discussing text of the
treaty and a statement of interest filed by the Department of State indicating that the executive
branch viewed the treaty as barring such claims). See Conference for the Treaty of Peace with Ja-
pan at 83 (cited in note 10) (statement of John Foster Dulles, Delegate of the United States) (de-
scribing some of the problems that would result "if the treaty validated, or kept contingently
alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan").
17 Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Press Release, Rohrabacher Introduces "Justice for
US. Prisoners of. War Act of 2001" (Mar 22, 2001), online at http://www.gop.gov/
item-news.asp?docId=412 6 4 (visited May 15,2003).
18 See note 4 and accompanying text.
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may constructively abrogate a treaty through a statutory order direct-
ing the federal courts to construe the treaty against its plain meaning.
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN TREATIES AND STATUTES
The Supreme Court has often noted "the separation of govern-
mental powers into three coordinate branches is essential to the pres-
ervation of liberty."'9 The Court also recognizes that a "hydraulic pres-
sure" exists within each branch to exceed its own structural limits and
to attempt to encroach on the powers of the other branches.20 In par-
ticular, the Framers believed that the legislative branch is prone to en-
21
croach upon the judicial and executive power.
The separation-of-powers doctrine, while not explicitly set forth
in the Constitution, is nonetheless deeply rooted in the Constitution'
and is designed to prevent the "commingling" of the various powers of
the government." The Constitption "establishes a judicial department
with the province and duty.., to say what the law is in particular cases
and controversies." The assignment of this responsibility to the
courts, as opposed to the legislature, is a key part of the separation-of-
powers scheme designed by the Framers.2 The separation-of-powers
doctrine is designed "both to protect the role of the independent judi-
ciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government... and
to safeguard litigants' right to have claims decided before judges who
19 Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,380 (1989).
20 See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a legislative veto
provision that allowed one House of Congress to invalidate certain decisions of the executive
branch).
21 See Federalist 73 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist 492,494 (Wesleyan
1961) (noting the "propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights and to ab-
sorb the powers of the other departments"); Federalist 51 (Madison), in Cooke, ed, The Federal-
ist 347, 350 ("In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.").
See also Mistretta, 488 US at 382 (highlighting the Framers' recognition of "the particular danger
of the Legislative Branch's accreting to itself judicial or executive power" and noting that the
Court has invalidated efforts by Congress "to exercise the responsibilities of other Branches or
to reassign powers vested by the Constitution in either the Judicial Branch or the Executive
Branch").
22 See National Mutual Insurance Co v Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 US 582,590 (1949) (not-
ing the "permeative nature" of the "fundamental" doctrine of separation of powers). See also
Mistretta, 488 US at 380.
23 See O'Donoghue v United States, 289 US 516, 530 (1933) (noting that the separation of
powers is "basic and vital" and is designed "to preclude a commingling of these essentially dif-
ferent powers of government in the same hands").
24 Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211,218 (1995) (holding unconstitutional on sepa-
ration of powers grounds a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that required fed-
eral courts to reopen final judgments in private civil actions), quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US
(1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803) (quotation marks omitted).
25 See Plaut, 514 US at 221 (noting the "sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the
judicial power").
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are free from potential domination by other branches of govern-
ment."
It is in this context of separated powers that one must understand
Alexander Hamilton's view that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts."" Understanding how the
Supreme Court evaluates the constitutional balance of power regard-
ing the creation, implementation, and interpretation of treaties and
statutes can provide a useful window into the application of the sepa-
ration-of-powers doctrine.
A. Treaties
1. The role of the various branches in treaty making.
The United States Constitution sets the basic framework for trea-
ties. First, the Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.' '" Along
with federal statutes and the Constitution itself, the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution provides that treaties made according to the con-
stitutional process are the "supreme Law of the Land."2 9 Finally, be-
cause the Constitution places treaties on the same footing as federal
statutes such that neither is superior to the other,"' subsequent acts of
Congress may enforce, modify, or repeal a treaty and its provisions."
2. Abrogation or modification of treaties.
The Court has long held that the choice to renege on a promise
made in a treaty is a matter best left to the political branches of the
government." Such modifications or repeals are accomplished through
26 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 848 (1986) (quotation
marks and citations omitted) (holding that the Commodity Exchange Act empowers the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission to entertain state law counterclaims in reparations proceed-
ings, and holding that this power does not violate Article III of the Constitution).
27 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed, The Federalist 521,525 (cited in note 21).
28 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
29 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
30 See Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 194 (1888) ("Both [congressional legislation and
treaties] are declared by [the Constitution] to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other."). See also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581,600
(1889) (same).
31 See Head Money Cases, 112 US 580,599 (1884) (discussing the effect on treaties of sub-
sequent federal statutes). It is important to note that such action by Congress would only have a
direct effect domestically. In the international realm, the repeal of a treaty provision would sim-
ply force the U.S. to go into default on its treaty obligations. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and
the United States Constitution 209-10 (Oxford 2d ed 1996) ("Acts of Congress inconsistent with
earlier treaty obligations ... [do] not affect the validity of the treaty and its continuing interna-
tional obligations for the United States, but it compels the United States to be in default.").
32 See Whitney, 124 US at 195 (noting that the choice to act in direct contravention of a
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the passage of federal legislation, which, under the Supremacy Clause,
has the same force as a treaty. 3 As with any ordinary legislation, if an
act of Congress and a treaty relate to the same subject, the courts will
construe them to give effect to both.i However, if doing so would vio-
late the language of either, the most recent provision will control."
This rule of interpretation is subject to one caveat: Congress must
clearly express its intent to abrogate a treaty provision in order for it
to be effective. ' The Court has never confronted the question of
whether an interpretive directive to the federal courts to construe a
treaty against its plain meaning satisfies this requirement.
3. Treaty interpretation.
The interpretation of a treaty is divided among the three coordi-
nate branches of government. Because the President is the "sole or-
gan" of the federal government in the field of international relations,
he possesses a "plenary and exclusive" power in the realm of foreign
affairs. 7 Of course, this power is cabined by constitutional provisions
that require him to share certain foreign policy powers with the other
branches." As a result of his central role in foreign policy, the Presi-
dent generally has the authority to interpret treaties in the interna-
tional arena.3 For this reason, the Court gives a great deal of weight to
treaty "belong[s] to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the administration of the laws").
33 See US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States ... and all Treaties made...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); Whitney, 124
US at 194 ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obliga-
tion, with an act of [congressional] legislation.").
34 See Whitney, 124 US at 194.
35 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US at 600 ("[T]he last expression of the sovereign
will must control."); Whitney, 124 US at 194 ("[l]f there be any conflict between the stipulations
of the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter must control.").
36 See, for example, Cook v United States, 288 US 102, 120 (1933) (holding that the re-
enactment of a piece of federal legislation would not abrogate a treaty provision where the legis-
lative record indicated no intent to directly modify or repeal that provision); Foster & Elam v
Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253,307 (1829) (holding that in order to abrogate a treaty Congress's in-
tent to do so must be "clearly expressed" and the "course of the nation has ... [to be] plain");
Norman J. Singer, 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 32.08 at 569 (Clark Boardman Cal-
laghan 5th ed 1993) ("As a matter of interpretation, the intent to abrogate a treaty provision by a
later act of Congress must be clearly expressed in order for it to have that effect.").
37 United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304,320 (1936) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a joint resolution by Congress and a presidential proclamation that made the
sale of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco a criminal offense).
38 See, for example, US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (dividing the Treaty Power and the appoint-
ment of Ambassadors between the President and the Senate). See also, US Const Art I, § 8, cl 11
(providing Congress with the power to "declare war"); US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (providing that
the President shall be the commander in chief).
39 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326, cmt a
(1987) ("The President has authority to interpret international agreements for the purpose of
United States foreign relations since he is the country's 'sole organ' in its international relations
and is responsible for carrying out agreements with other nations.").
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the interpretation of an international agreement by the executive
branch.'
Because of its constitutionally mandated role in the treaty-
making process, the Senate plays a part in the initial interpretation of
a treaty and may condition its consent on the adoption of certain pro-
visions or understandings. 1 However, the Supreme Court has held that
the Senate's ability to put forward its understanding of a treaty does
not extend beyond the ratification stage.'2 Thus, while the President
and the Senate have the power to interpret treaties in the first in-
stance because treaties are a form of federal law, 3 the courts have
carefully guarded their role as the final expositors of the meaning of
international agreements as they apply to cases and controversies be-
fore the courts.-
Courts, in interpreting a treaty, must begin with the language of
the treaty itself; the "clear import of treaty language" controls a
court's interpretation.' In addition, where adherence to the plain
meaning of a treaty's text would further the treaty's purposes, such a
40 See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184-85 (1982) (holding that
while the executive branch's interpretation of a treaty is not conclusive, it is entitled to great
weight).
41 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 404-10 (2000) (discussing the respective roles of the Senate and
President in the treaty-making process); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 326,
cmt a (cited in note 39) ("Interpretation by the Senate of a treaty after it has been concluded
may have no special authority, but understandings expressed by the Senate in giving its advice
and consent must be respected.").
42 See Fourteen Diamond Rings v United States, 183 US 176, 180 (1901) ("The meaning of
the treaty cannot be controlled by subsequent explanations of some of those who may have
voted to ratify it."). See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 326, cmt a (cited in
note 40). The notion underlying the Supreme Court's limited view of the Senate's role in inter-
preting treaties seems directly tied to the constitutional role assigned to the Senate. That is, the
Senate's role is limited by the Constitution to providing "advice and consent" (including ratifica-
tion by a two-thirds margin) to the President in his "making" of a treaty. See US Const Art II,
§ 2, cl 2. As a result, the ratification process that gives a treaty legal effect affords the Senate a
role at the outset but does not provide the Senate with a role in interpretation post-ratification.
Normatively, this seems to be a reasonable approach, particularly when contrasted with the def-
erence afforded to the executive. Additional deference to the executive is reasonable in light of
the broader foreign affairs powers the Constitution assigns to the President. In addition, as noted
earlier, the Senate does have a role to play in amendment or abrogation domestically, at least,
through application of the last-in-time rule.
43 See US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("[AIlI Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). See also note 33 and ac-
companying text.
44 See Jones v Meehan, 175 US 1, 32 (1899) ("The construction of treaties is the peculiar
province of the judiciary."). See also Japan Whaling Association v American Cetacean Society, 478
US 221, 230 (1986) (noting that the political question doctrine would not bar judicial construc-
tion of treaties and relevant statutes).
45 Sumitomo, 457 US at 180 (construing the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty
between the United States and Japan).
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plain reading is preferred. In evaluating the plain meaning of a treaty,
the court may examine whether such a reading is consistent with a va-
riety of other sources," including the discussions between the parties
during negotiations, other provisions of the treaty, and the current in-
terpretation of the treaty by both parties." When examining these
sources, the Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should be
mindful that their primary role in interpreting treaties is to give effect
to the intent of the parties involved,4 essentially treating a treaty as a
contract between sovereign states.'°
B. Statutes
For the purposes of amendment and repeal, treaties are function-
ally equivalent to statutes.51 Because the Justice for POWs Act at-
tempts to use the federal courts to constructively abrogate the Japan-
U.S. Peace Treaty, it is important to examine the Court's jurisprudence
regarding interpretive statutes.
1. Interpretive statutes and the courts.
The interpretation of a prior statute by a later Congress is gener-
ally not binding on the courts. 5 However, some treatise writers have
suggested that interpretive statutes are "increasingly" being treated as
binding by the lower federal courts.5 For example, in some cases,
courts have permitted Congress to define terms used in prior legisla-
tion through subsequent action, ' acquiesce in an agency interpretation
46 See id at 185-88 (discussing the agreement between the plain meaning and purpose of
the treaty).
47 See id at 182-85.
48 See id.
49 See id at 185.
50 See Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 US at 182-83 (stating that a treaty "differs from an
ordinary contract only in being an agreement between independent states instead of private par-
ties"). It is important to note that as a contract, the breach of a treaty has a variety of implica-
tions under international law. See, for example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8
ILM 679, Arts 54-64 (1969) (U.S. not a party) (discussing the termination and suspension of the
operation of treaties).
51 See Whitney, 124 US at 194.
52 See United States v Wise, 370 US 405, 414 (1962) (holding that the views of the 1914
Congress were "not of weight" for the purpose of interpreting an 1890 act); UnitedStates v Sta-
foff, 260 US 477,480 (1923) ("[A] statute purporting to declare the intent of an earlier one ... [is]
not entitled to control judicial action.").
53 See, for example, Singer, 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 27.04 at 472-74 (cited
in note 36) (discussing interpretive statutes and citing district court cases that treat such statutes
as binding).
54 See Ace Waterways v Fleming, 98 F Supp 666,667 (SD NY 1951) (holding that Congress
may "legislate by definition" even when it chooses to define "steam vessels" so as to include all
vessels powered by "steam or by any other form of mechanical or electrical power").
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of an earlier statute," or indicate its current understanding of prior
legislation." However, in the third arena, where Congress acts to ex-
press its current view of an existing statute, Judge Learned Hand
wrote: "Congress may no doubt indicate its understanding as to the
scope of its former words ... but its interpretation as such is immate-
rial. [Congress] is as likely to be wrong as any one else, and in the end
the courts must decide.'"5
In a subsequent case, Judge Hand went even further, and noted
that "legislative interpretation is immaterial . . . in that the courts
alone may in the end declare what a statute means.' ' 8 Even where
Congress expresses its view of an extant statute, the judiciary appears
committed to retaining the final authority to ascertain the proper ap-
plication of the statute in a case before the courts. Assigning such a
role to the courts makes sense in the context of a divided government,
where the legislature is responsible for enacting laws, the executive is
responsible for implementing the laws, and the judiciary is responsible
for interpreting the laws. 9
2. Adjudicating interbranch conflicts and the tension between
functionalism and formalism.
Although the separation-of-powers doctrine is essential to our
constitutional framework, it is not designed to isolate the three coor-
dinate branches from one another.'° Rather, when a conflict between
two or more branches arises, the Court has historically noted that the
judiciary must take "a pragmatic, flexible approach" in the adjudica-
55 See Sterling Oil & Gas Co v Lucas, 51 F2d 413,416 (WD Ky 1931) (holding that where a
longstanding agency ruling has the sanction of the legislature, the "departmental and legislative
construction is binding upon the courts").
56 See Fire Companies Building Corp v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 F2d 488,489
(2d Cir 1931) (noting that when Congress indicates its understanding of prior statutes, "and when
this can be treated as a command, it will control, subject to constitutional limits").
57 Id.
58 American Exchange Securities Corp v Helvering, 74 F2d 213,214 (2d Cir 1934).
59 This is not to suggest that Congress loses any of its legislative power when the courts
guard their interpretive authority-just the opposite. Interpretive statutes essentially seek to in-
volve the courts in the legislative process, directing the judiciary in the interpretation of prior
statutes without legislative amendment of the underlying statutory text. Where courts guard
their own role in interpretation, they preserve Congress's ability to legislate directly on a given
subject. Such an understanding of the role of the courts can be applied in both the statutory and
treaty contexts.
60 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683,707 (1974) ("[T]he separate powers were not in-
tended to operate with absolute independence."); United States v Brainer, 691 F2d 691,697 (4th
Cir 1982) ("The principle of the separation of powers does not set the three branches of gov-
ernment apart in absolute isolation."). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se-
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a worka-
ble government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.").
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tion of these conflicts. At the same time, more recent Supreme Court
cases suggest that a more formalistic approach may be warranted
where structural constitutional norms are at issue.u This tension be-
tween a formal, bright-line separation between the legislative and ju-
dicial power on one hand, and a more flexible approach on the other,
animates recent Supreme Court cases in this arena.63
In order to understand how this debate between functionalism
and formalism has developed in the statutory context, it is necessary
to examine the cases in which the Court initially explored the line be-
tween judicial and legislative power. In Pennsylvania v Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co (Wheeling Bridge I)," the Supreme Court desig-
nated a bridge between Virginia and Pennsylvania as a nuisance to
navigation and entered an injunction to have the bridge either raised
or removed.65 Following the Supreme Court's ruling, Congress passed
a law that declared the bridge a post-road and prohibited navigation
from interfering with the bridge.6 In a subsequent case, Pennsylvania v
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co (Wheeling Bridge II),67 the Supreme
Court examined Congress's action and held that Congress was permit-
ted to alter the prospective effects of the earlier injunction because
Congress had altered the underlying substantive law. 6
Sixteen years later, in United States v Klein,6 the Supreme Court
struck down a federal statute that required the Court to dismiss a set
of cases decided in the lower courts without any actual review by the
61 See Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 442-43 (1977) (indicating
that such a "pragmatic, flexible approach" is necessary because the Court has "squarely rejected
the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of authority between the
three branches" and noting that the Court has essentially adopted Justice Jackson's view ex-
pressed in his Youngstown concurrence). See also Brainer, 691 F2d at 697 ("The principle of the
separation of powers does not set the three branches of government apart in absolute isola-
tion.").
62 See, for example, Plaut, 514 US at 218-25 (noting that the important structural nature of
the separation of the powers doctrine, when combined with the longstanding threat of legislative
encroachment on the powers of the judiciary, provides an important reason for the judiciary to
ensure that such encroachment is carefully monitored).
63 Contrast id (adopting the formalist approach to the separation of powers doctrine), with
Robertson v Seattle Audubon Society, 503 US 429 (1992) (adopting a flexible approach to the
separation of powers doctrine).
64 54 US (13 How) 518 (1852).
65 See id at 577-79.
66 See Pennsylvania v Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co, 59 US (18 How) 421,431-32 (1855)
(Wheeling Bridge I1).
67 59 US (18 How) 421 (1855).
68 See id at 431-32. The decree entered in Wheeling Bridge I provided for prospective in-
junctive relief, not damages at law, the ongoing validity of which depended on whether or not the
bridge interfered with the right of navigation. When Congress altered the underlying law such
that the bridge was no longer an unlawful obstruction, the injunction against the maintenance of
the bridge was not enforceable.
69 80 US (13 Wall) 128 (1871).
110320031
The University of Chicago Law Review
Supreme Court.7° The Court held that such a statute constituted an in-
valid attempt by Congress to "prescribe rules of decision" to be fol-
lowed by the judiciary,71 and that such an attempt to cabin the author-
ity of the federal courts "passed the limit which separates the legisla-
tive from the judicial power."' The fundamental distinction between
Wheeling Bridge II and Klein was that in Wheeling Bridge II Congress
had not prescribed a different decision under the same law, but rather
had altered the law and left the court to "apply its ordinary rules to
the new circumstances created by the act."73
The distinction that the Court drew between altering the substan-
tive law on the one hand, and prescribing a rule of decision on the
other, has proven to be extremely difficult to apply in practice. Indeed,
the Supreme Court recently noted that the exact boundaries of its
holding in Klein are unclear. 4 Although this jurisprudence has been
the subject of dispute in recent years, courts are still unable to articu-
late a clear distinction between the Wheeling Bridge II line of cases
and the Klein line of cases. Doing so, however, is critical. The differ-
ence between altering the substantive law and prescribing a rule of
decision goes to the core of the separation of powers. In altering sub-
stantive law, Congress is clearly acting under its legislative powers
granted in Article I 6 However, by prescribing "rules of decision" for
the judiciary, Congress prevents the courts from exercising their Arti-
cle III role as interpreters of the law. In this way, the distinction be-
tween Wheeling Bridge II and Klein can be seen as a border in the
constitutional separation of powers that exists between Congress and
the courts. By applying this developing line of cases, and the distinc-
70 In Klein, the Supreme Court dealt with the case of a Confederate sympathizer who had
received a presidential pardon for his involvement in the Civil War and whose estate attempted
to recover the proceeds of the sale of cotton seized during the war. Klein attempted to recover
under a statute that allowed noncombatant Confederate landowners to recover the value of their
land upon proof of loyalty to the federal government. The Court of Claims ruled that under prior
Supreme Court precedent, the receipt of a pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty and, as such,
Klein was entitled to recovery. While the government's appeal was pending, Congress passed a
statute declaring that presidential pardons were evidence of disloyalty and purported to direct
the Supreme Court to dismiss any case where the claimant had prevailed by showing proof of
loyalty based on a presidential pardon. See id at 136-47.
71 Id at 146-48.
72 Id at 147.
73 Id.
74 See Plaut, 514 US at 218.
75 See, for example, Miller v French, 530 US 327 (2000) (holding that a provision of a stat-
ute did not unconstitutionally suspend or reopen an Article III court's judgment, but simply re-
flected the change implemented in another provision of the same statute that established new
standards for prospective relief); Robertson, 503 US at 437 (finding that the statute in question
did not change legal results, but changed the underlying law).
76 See US Const Art I, § 1.
77 See US Const Art III, §§ 1-2; Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 525 (cited in note 27) ("The in-
terpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.").
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tion the cases attempt to draw, to the Justice for POWs Act, this
Comment explores the tension between functionalism and formalism
and attempts to draw a few lessons about the proper scope of the
separation of powers. In the end, this Comment argues that the sepa-
ration-of-powers doctrine is clearly implicated by the Justice for
POWs Act and that a formalistic approach to the doctrine is necessary
to ensure that the carefully crafted balance created in the Constitution
is preserved.
III. FUNCTIONALISM VERSUS FORMALISM:
ANALYZING THE JUSTICE FOR POWS ACT
The question that the Wheeling Bridge II/Klein line of cases raises
with respect to the Justice for POWs Act is whether the Act, through
its order to the federal courts to construe the Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty
against its plain meaning, is a permissible attempt to change existing
law or an improper attempt to prescribe a rule of decision for the fed-
eral courts. Sorting through this question by examining the Supreme
Court's case law in this area and applying it to the Justice for POWs
Act reveals a latent tension between the functionalist and formalistic
approaches to the separation of powers. It is this tension that the latter
part of the Comment attempts to resolve by arguing that the formal
approach is normatively superior and comports best with the Supreme
Court's most recent decisions regarding the proper separation of
powers.
A. Stockdale and Robertson-Functionalism Applied
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court began taking a
functional approach to the separation of powers between the judiciary
and the legislative branch. In 1873, the Court dealt with a statute in
which Congress used language similar to that contained in the Justice
for POWs Act and upheld Congress's ability to legislate through the
use of a "shall construe" directive to the federal courts. 8 In Stockdale v
Insurance Cos,9 the Supreme Court confronted a tax statute designed
to amend and eliminate various tax provisions.'o Part of the statute de-
clared that certain existing tax laws, as modified, "shall be construed"
to impose the taxes on a specific date and that after that date the taxes
would no longer be levied or assessed.8' Citing Wheeling Bridge II for
the proposition that Congress may alter an existing law with prospec-
78 See Stockdale v Insurance Cos, 87 US (20 Wall) 323, 332-33 (1873) (interpreting the use
of a "shall construe" directive as an attempt to substantively amend an earlier statute).
79 87 (20 Wall) US 323 (1873).
80 Id at 330-31.
81 Idat331.
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tive effect, the Court in Stockdale held that the use of a directive to
the courts would not be viewed as an "invasion" of the judicial power
when Congress properly has the power and ability to legislate." As
such, the "unfortunate and unnecessary use of the word 'construe"'
did not invalidate the tax measure. On its face, this case seems to
suggest that, at least in areas where Congress may properly legislate,
the form of the statute is irrelevant and the Court will view an inter-
pretive directive to the judiciary as an attempt to substantively amend
the underlying law.?
More recent cases seem to support this reading of Stockdale and
the Wheeling Bride Il/Klein line of cases. In Seattle Audubon Society v
Robertson" (Seattle Audubon), the Ninth Circuit dealt with litigation
brought by environmental groups to force the government to comply
with a variety of federal environmental laws.M In response to the ongo-
ing litigation, Congress enacted a legislative compromise that pro-
vided: "Congress hereby determines and directs that management of[certain public lands] is adequate consideration for the purpose of
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consoli-
dated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F Dale
Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 .... ""
At first glance, the legislation appears to set forth an impermissi-
ble rule of decision in a specific set of cases in clear violation of the
Klein principle. Indeed, the Seattle Audubon plaintiffs aggressively ar-
gued this position, pointing to the mandatory language used by Con-
gress and the actual identification of the affected cases in the text of
the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that the legislation im-
properly intruded upon the judiciary's power to adjudicate cases
properly before the courts. The court held that the legislation "does
not, by its plain language, repeal or amend" the underlying law, but at-
tempts to "direct the court to reach a specific result and make certain
factual findings under existing law" -a result prohibited by Klein." On
appeal, in Robertson v Seattle Audubon Society" (Robertson), the Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that rather than pre-
82 See id at 332.
83 Id at331,333.
84 See id at 332-33.
85 914 F2d 1311 (9th Cir 1990), revd, Robertson v Seattle Audubon Society, 503 US 429
(1992).
86 See Seattle Audubon, 914 F2d at 1312-13.
87 Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub L No
101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat 701,747 (1989).
88 See Seattle Audubon, 914 F2d at 1317 ("Congress did not amend or repeal laws, as it un-
questionably could do, but rather prescribed a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way,
without changing the underlying laws, as it unquestionably cannot do.").
89 Id at 1316.
90 503 US 429 (1992).
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scribing a rule of decision, Congress had actually modified the under-
lying law through the subsequent legislative compromise." The Court
held that if Congress has the ability to change the underlying law (and
appears to have done so), the use of imperative language will not ren-
der the statute invalid as a usurpation of judicial authority under
Klein.9
Taken together, Stockdale and Robertson seem to indicate that
the Court is taking a more functional approach to Klein-type cases.
Under this "flexible" approach, because Congress clearly has the
power to amend or abrogate a treaty through subsequent legislation,
even the use of statutory language that appears to direct the judici-
ary's construction of a treaty is unlikely to affect the statute's validity.
In particular, Robertson seems to suggest that this will be true even
when such legislation clearly takes the form of a direct order to the
federal courts.
As a result, when examined solely in the context of Robertson
and Stockdale, the Justice for POWs Act appears likely to withstand a
separation-of-powers challenge as a valid exercise of Congress's ac-
knowledged ability to alter a treaty through subsequent legislation. 9
B. The Court's Renewed Formalism
However, this is not the end of the story. It is important to note
that the Court's decision in Robertson came prior to the Rehnquist
Court's recent efforts to police what some have termed "underen-
forced constitutional norms."' In 1992, the year that Robertson was
decided, law professors William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey identi-
fied two such underenforced norms: federalism limitations on con-
gressional action and the separation-of-powers doctrine.9 Since 1992,
taking up Eskridge and Frickey's challenge, the Supreme Court has
begun to enforce federalism limitations in cases like United States v
Lopez, United States v Morrison," and Printz v United States.9 Simi-
91 See id at 438-41.
92 See id at 439.
93 See Head Money Cases, 112 US 580, 599 (1884) ("[S]o far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance .... it is sub-
ject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.").
94 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212 (1978).
95 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593,630-31 (1992).
96 514 US 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because Con-
gress lacked the power to enact the statute under the Commerce Clause).
97 529 US 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy provided in the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 because Congress lacked the authority to enact the statute under either the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment).
98 521 US 898 (1997) (invalidating interim provisions of the Brady Act because they vio-
110720031
The University of Chicago Law Review
larly, in the separation-of-powers arena, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, IncJ in 1995 and City of Boerne v
Flores... in 1997 appear to indicate a new willingness on the part of the
Supreme Court to carefully scrutinize legislative efforts to intrude
upon the role historically assigned to the judiciary.'°' More importantly,
these cases also appear to indicate a new willingness by some mem-
bers of the Court to engage in a more formalistic approach to enforc-
ing such underenforced norms.'O Supporters of this trend believe that
a formalistic approach to enforcing these structural safeguards, such as
the separation of powers, is crucial. As the Court pointed out in Printz:
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form
of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated
measures deviating from that form. The result may appear "for-
malistic" in a given case ... [b]ut the Constitution ... divides
power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate
power in one location. 'O3
This formalistic approach to the separation of powers embodied in the
Court's more recent cases appears to conflict with the Court's histori-
cally more functional approach.
C. Latent Tensions-Functionalism versus Formalism
If the Court were to face a constitutional challenge to the Justice
for POWs Act under the Klein separation-of-powers doctrine, it is far
from clear that Robertson would control the result. Indeed, the
Court's divergent jurisprudence establishes a latent tension between
the Plaut approach, in which formalism is used to enforce the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine to protect the judiciary from legislative en-
croachment, and the Robertson approach, in which a more "flexible
lated state sovereignty by compelling states and state officials to administer a federal regulatory
scheme).
99 514 US 211 (1995).
100 521 US 507 (1997) (holding Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional on
separation of powers grounds).
101 See, for example, id at 536 (discussing the role of the judiciary vis-A-vis the legislature in
interpreting the Constitution); Plaut, 514 US at 227-33 (noting that serious separation of powers
issues are raised when Congress attempts to undertake a role properly assigned to the judiciary).
102 See Benjamin v Jacobson, 172 F3d 144, 179-80 (2d Cir 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi con-
curring) (discussing the "formal structure of the separation of powers doctrine" and the Supreme
Court's move towards formalism in federalism and separation of powers cases).
103 521 US at 933, quoting New York v United States, 505 US 144, 187 (1992) (quotation
marks omitted). It is true that New York was decided a scant three months after Robertson.
However, when viewed in the context of the Court's federalism and separation of powers rulings
since Robertson, it seems clear that the Court is pursuing these constitutional values with a re-
newed formalist vigor.
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and pragmatic" view is taken in addressing a potential conflict be-
tween the branches and is eventually resolved in favor of the legisla-
ture.'O' The Justice for POWs Act provides a useful case study for ex-
amining how this tension may be addressed.
It might be assumed that the Supreme Court is likely simply to
apply the more recent Plaut approach in order to protect the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine. However, there are two major barriers to the
Court applying its renewed fervor for formalism to the Justice for
POWs Act. First, courts are generally loath to interpret statutes in
ways that raise serious constitutional questions.n' In the case of the
Justice for POWs Act, if the Court applies the formalism of Plaut, it is
likely to determine that the Act is unconstitutional. Therefore, one
might expect application of the canon of constitutional avoidance to
lead the court to apply the more flexible approach adopted in Robert-
son. Even more importantly, if the Court were to apply a more formal
approach to such legislation, it faces the serious problem of having to
either overrule Robertson explicitly, or interpret its holding so nar-
rowly as to eviscerate Robertson's precedential value. Given the cur-
rent Court's concern with the doctrine of stare decisis, 8 it seems
unlikely to engage in such an exercise without good reason to do so.
At the same time, however, in the Supreme Court's most recent
application of the Klein doctrine, Miller v French,' the Court held that
where Congress expresses a clear intent, the Court must give effect to
that intent even if that means confronting a constitutional question."
As such, if a strong argument can be made that Congress's clear intent
in passing the Justice for POWs Act was to constructively abrogate the
Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty, and if there are strong reasons for taking a
more formal approach to the separation of powers, the Court will
104 For an excellent introduction to the formalist-functionalist debate, see Adrian Vermeule,
The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 S Ct Rev 357,362-70.
105 See Communications Workers of America v Beck, 487 US 735, 762 (1988) (holding that
the courts should avoid a constitutionally doubtful construction of a statute where "fairly possi-
ble").
106 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833,
854-61 (1992) (applying the doctrine of stare decisis to strike down, in part, a Pennsylvania abor-
tion statute).
107 530 US 327 (2000).
108 See id at 341. In Miller, the Court faced a Wheeling Bridge ll/Klein challenge to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act and squarely confronted the constitutional question of whether
Congress could prohibit federal courts from exercising their equitable authority to suspend the
operation of an automatic stay. See id at 331. The Court rejected the constitutional challenge and
held that because the PLRA dealt with prospective equitable relief, it was a valid effort by Con-
gress to change the underlying law based on Wheeling Bridge 11, and therefore did not reopen a
final judgment of the federal courts under Plaut. See id at 346-48. In addition, the Court held
that the Klein challenge on separation of powers grounds could not be upheld since the poten-
tially problematic stay provision was directly tied to valid, substantive change in the underlying
law. See id at 344-49.
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likely confront the constitutional separation-of-powers question head
on109on.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
-THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
Although it is unclear whether the Court would apply a formal or
functional approach to the Justice for POWs Act, the best approach to
this statute (and others that attempt to engage in similar encroach-
ments on the judicial role) is the formal approach taken in the Klein
line of cases. Formalism preserves the separation of powers and pre-
vents Congress from directing the courts to interpret a statute in a
given manner, even where (and perhaps particularly where) Congress
has the power to amend the statute directly. By requiring that Con-
gress directly abrogate the treaty or statute in question, the Court can
ensure that Congress does not hide behind the federal courts to avoid
paying the steep, up-front political costs of its actions. In addition, such
a mechanism would recognize the primary role that the political
branches play in foreign affairs and would allow the courts to avoid
entanglement in this politically sensitive arena.
One way the Court may accomplish this is by applying a clear
statement rule to legislative efforts to amend or abrogate a treaty.
Such a rule would require Congress to be "unambiguous" in a statute
aimed at amending a substantive provision of a treaty. The application
of this rule would require Congress to actually amend the underlying
substantive law, rather than using the courts as a tool to constructively
abrogate the treaty. That is, in order for a statute to be "clear enough"
to comply with the rule, Congress must directly do what the Justice for
POWs Act would instead accomplish through a directive to the courts.
A. Benefits of the Clear Statement Approach
The Court has increasingly employed the clear statement rule in
protecting other structural constitutional provisions in order to ensure
that Congress carefully considers its attempts to override such consti-
tutionally grounded values."0 In addition, the Court often uses clear
statement rules to support various canons of statutory construction.
For example, the Supreme Court has used clear statement rules in the
past to reinforce or apply the canon of constitutional avoidance and
109 See Edward J DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988) (noting that the canon of constitutional avoidance may only be
applied where the saving construction is not "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"); United
States v Locke, 471 US 84, 96 (1985) ("We cannot press statutory construction to the point of dis-
ingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question.") (quotation marks omitted).
110 For a general discussion, see Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 598-611 (cited in
note 95).
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the rule of lenity."' Indeed, when viewed in this sense, a clear state-
ment rule that requires Congress to actually abrogate a treaty can be
seen as nothing more than an effort to buttress and reinforce another
statutory interpretation canon-the canon against implied 
repeals.1 1 2
In addition, this result also complies with standard treaty jurispru-
dence, which requires Congress to clearly indicate its intent to amend
a treaty.13
1. Requiring Congress to bear the initial political costs.
There are a number of normative justifications for applying a
formalistic clear statement rule to buttress both the canon against im-
plied repeals and the clear intent rule for treaties. Both of these judi-
cially enforced guidelines for statutory construction are generally
aimed at ensuring that Congress carefully considers the action it pro-
poses to take. Such consideration is particularly important in the con-
text of treaties because of their unique status as both domestic laws
and international obligations. One major effect of requiring Congress
to directly amend or abrogate the treaty is that it forces members of
Congress to pay the political costs of such a change up front. The use
of the "shall not construe" language in the Justice for POWs Act can
be understood as an attempt by members of Congress to avoid the po-
litical costs on both the domestic and international fronts that would
be associated with a congressional effort to actually amend or abro-
gate the treaty."4 Indeed, the legislation as drafted seems clearly aimed
at allowing members of Congress to claim credit with the POW
groups-who will understand that Congress created the conditions al-
lowing them to recover-while at the same time being able to point to
the federal courts as the guilty parties if they face criticism for abro-
gating the treaty.I"
111 See id at 599-601.
112 See, for example, Watt v Alaska, 451 US 259, 266-67 (1981) ("[R]epeals by implication
are not favored."); Morton v Mancari, 417 US 535, 549 (1974) (same); Posadas v National City
Bank, 296 US 497,503 (1936) (same). See also United States v Borden Co, 308 US 188,198 (1939)
("The intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.") (quotation marks omit-
ted), quoting Red Rock v Henry, 106 US 596,602 (1883).
113 See note 36.
114 As a matter of international law, the decision by a national legislature to abrogate a
treaty, while perhaps politically controversial, is largely unremarkable. Nations abrogate and
modify treaties with some regularity and the international system has developed a wide range of
mechanisms to deal with such abrogation. See, for example, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 8 ILM 679, Arts 54-64 (1969) (U.S. not a party) (discussing the termination and
suspension of the operation of treaties).
115 See, for example, Statement of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Paying Homage to a
Special Group of Veterans, Survivors of Bataan and Corregidor, 107th Cong, 1st Sess, in 147
Cong Rec H 3993-95 (July 12,2001).
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It might be argued that given the sophisticated parties that are af-
fected by this legislation -politically active citizens groups and foreign
nations-such an attempt by Congress tb shift the political costs to the
courts is doomed from the start. While this is clearly correct in many
respects, there are important limitations to this principle. First, it is
important to note that the clear statement approach is not designed to
account for long-term political costs; rather, it is designed to ensure
that Congress accounts for the political costs immediately prior to and
during debate over the resolution. Here, the notion of providing bene-
fits to U.S. POWs who suffered deprivations at the hands of a wartime
enemy is particularly politically appealing. Indeed, given our strong
relationship with Japan in recent decades, it is reasonable to think that
an individual member of Congress may discount the Japanese re-
sponse to such legislation. As a result, a member of Congress may not
accurately consider the international political costs of abrogation as
weighed against the expected domestic political gain from supporting
the politically influential POW groups. At the same time, the construc-
tive abrogation approach is also attrastive to members of Congress
who are concerned about the potential international political costs but
still support providing a remedy to American POWs. By using the
courts as the mechanism for carrying out their preferred policy, mem-
bers of Congress who are concerned about directly abrogating the
treaty can justify a vote in favor of the U.S. POWs by arguing that
while a direct abrogation may result in serious problems abroad, a
more subtle and narrowly tailored change may be more acceptable at
the margins. Indeed, this latter explanation provides a reasonable ex-
planation for the actual wording of the Justice for POWs Act as a di-
rective to the courts. This analysis suggests that in order to ensure that
Congress properly accounts for the decision to constructively abro-
gate the treaty, it must be required to bear the political costs of abro-
gation up front-prior to and during the consideration of the Justice
for POWs Act or similar legislation.
Requiring members of Congress to bear the political cost of ab-
rogation up front would likely lead to a congressional debate over the
costs and benefits of abrogation-a debate the Justice for POWs Act
attempts to circumvent by using the courts to implement its legislative
policy. It is important to note that the'forcing effect of such a clear
statement rule is crucial to the separation-of-powers values that the
rule is attempting to protect. Even if one believes that Congress's in-
tent to abrogate the treaty at issue in the Justice for POWs Act is
clear, it still makes sense to select a rule that ensures proper consid-
eration of consequences and protects the courts from political in-
volvement. The underlying notion here is that Congress should not be
able to use the federal courts as its tool to achieve politically
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controversial results, regardless of the circumstances. This approach
parallels the typical application of the canon against implied repeals,
which serves to ensure that Congress bears the political costs of re-
pealing legislation and ensures that Congress, not the courts, is the
prime mover in the legislative arena.
2. Leaving foreign affairs to the political branches.
Another important normative reason to apply a clear statement
rule is that such an approach also comports with the Court's oft-
expressed notion that foreign affairs issues are better left to the politi-
cal branches. " The clear intent requirement for amending a treaty re-
flects this concern with the institutional competence of the courts in
foreign affairs. As such, the proposed clear statement rule can be seen
as a strengthened and revitalized version of the clear intent require-
ment.
One of the key problems with the Justice for POWs Act is that it
not only uses the courts as a tool to do what the Congress and the
President are constitutionally charged to do-the enactment of a
change in federal law-but that it does so with respect to a treaty. As a
result, by attempting to constructively abrogate the Japan-U.S. Peace
Treaty through the courts, Congress is forcing the judiciary to become
directly involved in the very politically sensitive arena of foreign af-
fairs.
Some may argue that this involvement is no different than in any
judicial case in which foreign affairs are implicated. In addition, it may
be pointed out that while courts may generally be reticent to become
involved in foreign affairs disputes, by no means has the judiciary
completely avoided such involvement."' However, the unique form
that the involvement engendered by the Justice for POWs Act takes
renders the judiciary's involvement in this case somewhat more prob-
lematic. This is so because on its face the Justice for POWs Act does
not actually amend the treaty and then require the courts to carry out
the decision of the political branches. Rather, the POWs Act requires
116 See, for example, Oetjen v Central Leather Co, 246 US 297, 302 (1918) (holding that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to
the Executive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government" and that judi-
cial inquiry into these areas is generally inappropriate); Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 195
(1888) (noting that the determination of foreign relations matters is not confided in the judici-
ary).
117 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398,423 (1964) (noting that "it cannot
of course be thought that 'every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance"' and holding that "[t]he text of the Constitution ... does not irrevocably re-
move from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state"), quoting
Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,211 (1962).
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the courts to be active participants in the actual abrogation of the
treaty by having the courts ignore the treaty's plain language.
It may be argued that any opinion from a court that allows POWs
to sue is likely to point to the Justice for POWs Act as the reason the
suits are able to go forward; this would indicate that Congress, not the
courts, is acting in the foreign affairs realm. The point this argument
misses is the active role that the courts are forced to take in the politi-
cal act of abrogation under this legislation. While the political
branches have set the policy by enacting the statute, the courts are not
only implementing congressional policy in particular cases (as is typi-
cal for any statute), but are required to read a treaty against its plain
meaning to reach that result. That is, in this case, the courts not only
enforce the policy of the political branches, but they become part of
the process by which the policy is initially implemented, a role nor-
mally left to the executive branch. It is this unique problem that cre-
ates the threat to the proper separation of powers. Indeed, this prob-
lem of policy entanglement is only magnified when it takes place in
the context of foreign affairs, where the political branches are in-
tended to be the primary actors.
While this view of the Act is open to the criticism that it is overly
formalistic, there are strong arguments for applying such a formal ap-
proach in the separation-of-powers context. Indeed, these arguments
are especially applicable in the foreign affairs arena, where the courts
have developed a wide range of doctrinal approaches to limit the very
type of political entanglements that this legislation seems to create.'18
B. Defending Formalism
In applying the clear statement rule proposed above to the Jus-
tice for POWs Act, the Court would essentially be prohibiting Con-
gress from employing its chosen method of achieving the result it
seeks. Instead, the Court would require Congress to explicitly state its
intention to abrogate the treaty. In a sense then, this formulation of a
clear statement rule is somewhat more formalistic than other applica-
tions of clear statement rules. ' It requires Congress not only to care-
118 See, for example, Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 US at 416 (discussing the act of state
doctrine, which concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement par-
ticular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations); Baker, 369 US at 211-13 (discuss-
ing the political question doctrine in the foreign relations context).
119 In other cases, the Court has applied a clear statement rule to situations in which Con-
gress may properly override the constitutionally based value identified by the courts. In this way,
the rules permit Congress to achieve its result through its chosen method, but only if Congress
expresses its intent to do so using explicit and unambiguous language. For example, the Court
has established super-strong clear statement rules to cabin congressional efforts to place federal
conditions on state administration of federal programs, to waive states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, to regulate core state functions, to regulate intergovernmental taxation, and to apply
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fully consider the constitutional value at stake, but also to undertake
its action in a manner that comports with the underlying constitu-
tional value. That is, Congress may not engage in an attack on the
separation of powers by using the courts to amend a treaty when it
could actually amend the treaty itself.
It may be argued that such an approach simply serves to elevate
form over substance. However, what is critically important is that this
formal approach is aimed at achieving a very specific and substantive
result-ensuring that the proper separation of powers is maintained
between the judicial and legislative branches. It is important to re-
member that Congress could amend the treaty if it so desired. Thus,
the only way in which the rule "elevates form over substance" is to
prevent an attempt by Congress to use the federal judiciary as its leg-
islative tool.
Judge Guido Calabresi has aggressively argued that formalism is
particularly important in the separation-of-powers context.'1 As Judge
Calabresi points out, the separation-of-powers doctrine is "a structural
safeguard" that establishes "high walls and clear distinctions. ''.. Such a
distinction is needed "because low walls and vague distinctions will
not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.' ' .3 This
argument essentially suggests that while flexibility may generally be
useful in constitutional adjudication, interbranch conflicts raise the
specter of one branch justifying its encroachment on the role properly
federal statutes to state and local political processes. See, for example, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501
US 452, 460-62 (1991) (arguing that the federal courts must be certain of Congress's intent be-
fore finding that federal law overrides the constitutional balance of federal and state powers);
Davis v Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 US 803, 813 (1989) ("When Congress codifies a
judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement to the contrary, that Con-
gress intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that concept by the courts."); McNally v
United States, 483 US 350, 359-60 (1987) (holding that, given two readings of a criminal statute,
one harsher than the other, a court will choose the harsher one only when "Congress has spoken
in clear and definite language"); Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234,242-43 (1985)
(holding Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in "unmis-
takable language"); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 US 1, 17 (1982) ("[I]f
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambigu-
ously."). In these cases, the Court held that where Congress explicitly overrides a constitutional
value in the text of a statute, the judiciary will give effect to Congress's intent. Consider South
Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 207 (1987) (upholding a condition on federal highway funds where
Congress had clearly indicated its intent to place conditions on the funds).
120 This type of approach can be understood as adopting legal formalism as a pragmatic
strategy. Because the desired end is to ensure that courts retain their interpretive role vis-A-vis
treaties while preserving a role for Congress in amending or abrogating treaties on the domestic
front, applying formalism to achieve this end is a wholly pragmatic approach. Consider Richard
A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy 49 (Harvard 2003) (discussing formalism as a prag-
matic strategy).
121 See note 102.
122 Benjamin v Jacobson, 172 F3d 144,180 (2d Cir 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi concurring).
123 Id, quoting Plaut, 514 US at 239.
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assigned to another under the cover of "flexibility." Therefore, where
the branches come into conflict, it is important to have bright-line
rules that delineate where the responsibilities of one branch end and
those of another branch begin.
Indeed, as Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar point out, adopting
a formalistic approach to the separation of powers is often the only
way to ensure that the branches do not intrude upon one another's
roles."4 In contrast, the "flexible" approach to the separation of pow-
ers, as adopted in Stockdale and Robertson, is really no approach at
all -it does nothing to preserve the separation of powers between the
judiciary and legislature and essentially allows the courts to be used as
the legislative branch's tool in implementing politically controversial
initiatives. In many ways, this is the very foundation of Klein: Congress
cannot set out a rule of decision for the courts by intruding on their
historic responsibilities. As a result, the formalistic approach makes
sense not only in the context of treaty interpretation but can be un-
derstood as applying more broadly across the spectrum of separation-
of-powers conflicts. Indeed, one can already see the application of this
formalistic approach in a variety of separation-of-powers cases out-
side the foreign affairs context.''
Formalism, as applied to the Justice for POWs Act through a
clear statement rule, requires Congress to be more politically account-
able by forcing members of Congress to bear the political costs of
treaty abrogation up front. In addition, formalism here ensures that
the political branches grapple with important foreign affairs issues di-
rectly, rather than through the courts. This is particularly important in
an area where the judiciary lacks institutional competence, at least
relative to the political branches. In this sense, a bright-line rule in the
foreign affairs arena is all the more important in preserving the sepa-
ration-of-powers values discussed above.
CONCLUSION
The Justice for POWs Act forcefully raises the question of how
far Congress may go in cabining the judiciary's historic role in inter-
preting treaties. As such, the Act is in tension with the structural con-
stitutional values embodied in the separation-of-powers doctrine. In
order to determine how best to preserve the values underlying this
doctrine, it is helpful to recall James Madison's admonition in Federal-
ist 51: "[T]he greatest security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
124 See Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 Duke L J 449,462-65 (1991).
125 See notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others."
1 '
In the end, the duty to resist incursions by the legislative branch
may fall to the "least dangerous branch.' 27 The application of the clear
statement rule is one method that the judiciary can use to address leg-
islative efforts to encroach upon the proper role of the courts in treaty
and statutory interpretation.
126 Federalist 51 (Madison) at 349 (cited in note 21).
127 See Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 522-23 (cited in note 27) (referring to the judiciary as
the branch "least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution" because it "has no influ-
ence over either the sword or the purse"). See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dan-
gerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Yale 2d ed 1986).
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